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Major Legal Issues Arising from the
Use of the Geostationary Orbit
Stephen Gorove*
INTRODUCTION
The remarkable scientific and technological developments of the past three
decades have resulted in the increasing use of the "geostationary orbit." 1
Advances in the technology of broadcasting, meteorological reconnais-
sance, tracking and data relay from orbital satellites, for example, have
greatly enlarged its importance. 2 The growing number of geostationary
satellites and the anticipated increases in their use have evoked widespread
concerns among many less-developed countries (LDCs) about the early
preemption of available orbital positions by more developed nations. At-
tention has focused on the question of the maximum number of satellites
that can be accommodated in the orbit. Although estimates have varied
widely, ranging from 180 to 1,800, a study prepared by the United Nations
Secretariat correctly observed that it was "impossible" to determine pre-
cisely the number of satellites that could occupy the geostationary orbit.
The Secretariat concluded, however, that it was possible to determine
whether a specific satellite system, with all its physical parameters defined,
would interfere with other systems. 
3
Interference may result from physical impact or collision with other
satellites, or from the simultaneous use of the radio spectrum, the availa-
bility of which is limited. While overcrowding of the geostationary orbit
may not become a problem for many years (perhaps the problem may be
avoided by improved or new technologies), the increasing concern of LDCs
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with the possible preemption of the orbit by more developed nations has
raised a number of significant issues.
CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER
THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT
Is the geostationary orbit a part of outer space? This question was brought
to the fore by the Bogota Declaration of 1976,4 in which eight equatorial
countries claimed segments of the orbit directly above them as integral
parts of their national territories over which they exercised complete and
exclusive sovereignty. These countries also declared that segments of the
orbit over the high seas constituted the "common heritage of mankind."
In support of their claim, they argued principally that there was no satis-
factory definition of outer space to warrant the inclusion of the geostation-
ary orbit in outer space; that the ban on national appropriation mandated
by article II of the Outer Space Treaty 5 of 1967 was not applicable because
of the lack of such a definition; and, consequently, that the geostationary
satellite orbit (GSO) was not covered by the Outer Space Treaty. 6
International Customary Law
Before the recent claims of equatorial countries, no formal objections had
been made by underlying states to the orbiting directly overhead of satel-
lites by other countries. This acquiescence for almost two decades of satel-
lite launchings appeared to indicate a general consensus that earth orbiting
satellites were located in outer space and not in an area subject to the
sovereignty of the underlying state. Even though no precise line had been
drawn between air space and outer space, a norm of customary interna-
tional law seemed to have emerged. 7
International Treaty Law
The Outer Space Treaty, the first major international agreement of its kind,
was negotiated out of a desire to establish principles governing man's
activities in outer space. As earth orbiting satellites represented the princi-
pal activities before and during the drafting of the treaty, the drafters must
have intended to apply the treaty provisions, including the freedom of
exploration and use of outer space, to satellites irrespective of whether
they moved in lower or higher orbits. If the Outer Space Treaty applied
to earth orbiting satellites, then its ban on the national appropriation of
outer space by claim of sovereignty or by any other means also applied. 8
In view of international customary and treaty law, the legal validity of
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the claims of equatorial countries received little support in the United
Nations. 9 The recent UNISPACE Conference summarized the dominant
view in the following statement:
Despite the lack of agreement on defining the precise boundary between
airspace and outer space, it is accepted by most nations that GSO is a part
of outer space and, as such, it is available for use by all States, in accordance
with the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 10
In all fairness to the position adopted by the equatorial countries at
Bogota, one should note that, in their view, the geostationary orbit was a
physical phenomenon related to the reality of our planet because its exis-
tence depended exclusively on the earth's gravitational phenomena. For
this reason, they felt it should not be included in the concept of outer space
but instead, regulated, under a sui generis regime. 11
NATIONAL APPROPRIATION
Another major issue that has been raised in connection with the claims of
equatorial states is whether article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which
prohibits the national appropriation of outer space, bars the placement and
maintenance of satellites in designated geostationary orbital locations.
Such a result would undermine claims of sovereignty over segments of the
orbit; in fact, it appears to deny the existence of any right, by claim of
sovereignty or otherwise, to the continued exclusive use of orbital loca-
tions.
Crucial to a proper analysis of this issue is an understanding of the
concept of "appropriation." The term "appropriation" in law is used most
frequently to signify "the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use
with a sense of permanence." 12 The word" thus indicates something more
than just casual use.
The question then becomes whether the continued exclusive occupation
by a geostationary satellite of the same physical area is a violation of the
ban on national appropriation. While a state may certainly exercise exclu-
sive control over a traditional object, such as a ship, or an aircraft, or a part
of airspace, it is not clear that a satellite in geostationary orbit would be
able to maintain its exact position and occupy the same area over a period
of time. 13 Even if a position could be accurately maintained, and thus
possibly constitute an "appropriation" within the meaning of article II, the
satellite would have to be kept in that orbit with a "sense of permanence"
and not on a temporary basis.
It has been suggested that the keeping of a solar power satellite in
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geostationary orbit for a period of thirty years would not constitute appro-
priation. 14 In point of fact, thirty years would probably satisfy the "sense
of permanence" requirement, unless the geostationary orbit were consid-
ered a natural resource as characterized by the International Telecommuni-
cation Convention of 1973 (ITC) 15 and as claimed by the equatorial
countries. Authority exists to support the view that the ban on national
appropriation of outer space does not relate to resources. 16 In view of this
and the additional fact that solar energy is an inexhaustible and unlimited
resource, its utilization for transmission to earth by satellites does not
appear to fall under the prohibition of article II of the 1967 Treaty.
EQUITABLE ACCESS
The third major issue concerning the use of the geostationary orbit is the
definition of the term "equitable access," which appears in several interna-
tional instruments associated with the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU). The use of this phrase reflects the persistent efforts of LDCs
to guarantee for themselves equal rights to the geostationary orbit. Their
efforts yielded early results with the adoption of a resolution by the 1971
World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications
(WARC-ST) which, while not constituting a legal obligation, stated in
rather unequivocal terms that all countries had equal rights to both the use
of radio frequencies allocated to various space radio communication ser-
vices and to the geostationary satellite orbits associated with them. 17 The
resolution also stated that the radio frequency spectrum and the geosta-
tionary satellite orbit were limited natural resources required to be used
most effectively and economically. Moreover, the resolution stressed that
registration with the ITU of frequency assignments for space radio com-
munication services and their use should not provide any permanent pri-
ority for any individual country or groups of countries and should not
create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by other coun-
tries. 18
In 1973, the term "equitable access" appeared for the first time in an
international agreement binding on the parties. The International Tele-
communication Convention stipulated that
In using frequency bands for space radio services Members shall bear in mind
that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural
resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically so that coun-
tries or groups of countries may have equitable access to both in conformity
with the provisions of radio regulations according to their needs and the
technical facilities at their disposal. 19
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The convention also mandated that all stations, whatever their purpose,
must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful
interference to the radio services or communications of other members. 20
The requirement of equitable access was reiterated in Resolution No. 3
of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC '79) in the
proviso contemplating a future WARC "to guarantee in practice for all
countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the fre-
quency bands allocated to space services." 21 This particular sentence of the
Resolution appeared to be a broad sweeping provision requiring uncondi-
tional equitable access if considered in isolation and if the words "in
practice" were interpreted to mean "in fact" rather than "in use." This
language must, however, be read in the full context of all relevant ITU
instruments.
Resolutions of the ITU administrative conferences are not legally bind-
ing but rather expressions of aspirations, if not moral commitments. By
contrast, the ITC and the Radio Regulations legally bind the states which
are parties to them. Any meaningful attempt to interpret Resolution 3 of
WARC '79 should bear in mind that ITC provisions and WARC resolu-
tions on equitable access are closely related. Thus, it is essential to consider,
in addition to Resolution 3 itself, Resolution 2 of WARC '79 22 and article
33 of the ITC.
As for Resolution 3, it should be stressed that the guarantee of equitable
access "in practice" does not refer to an already existing situation but only
to a goal to be achieved since the resolution states that a future conference
would be called "to guarantee in practice for all countries equitable ac-
cess." Other sections of the Resolution also speak of the "need for" equita-
ble access, implying that it does not exist at the present time.
The phrase "guarantee in practice" can be interpreted to mean that the
guarantee hinges "on practice;" that is, without "practice," or ability to
engage "in practice," there can be no guarantee. In other words, the coun-
tries must actually be able to use the geostationary orbit and not just
merely assert a claim in order to avail themselves of the guarantee of
equitable access. To be sure, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the
position that the words "guarantee in practice" mean "guarantee in fact."
Several persuasive arguments exist, however, which appear to support
fully the position that the guarantee is related to actual use. Resolution 3
clearly states that its reference to equitable access is "as provided for" in
article 33 of the ITC which, in turn, dictates that such access is to be
afforded in conformity with the radio regulations and according to the
countries' "needs and the technical facilities at their disposal." Article 33
thus confirms that, without a demonstrated need and the ability to use the
orbit measured in terms of available technical facilities, no guarantee or
right to such access exists.
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This interpretation does not conflict with the letter and spirit of Resolu-
tion 3 and Resolution 2. Resolution 3 also notes that the use of the orbit-
spectrum resource by individual countries and groups of countries can take
place at "various points of time," based on their "requirements" and the
"availability of the resources at their disposal." An almost identical state-
ment appears in Resolution 2, except that instead of the phrase "availabili-
ty of the resources at their disposal," Resolution 2 contains the words
"readiness of technical facilities of countries."
It is clear from this analysis that the two crucial preconditions of equita-
ble access set forth in Article 33-"need" and "availability of technical
facilities"-have not been changed by the two resolutions of WARC '79.
On the contrary, the Resolutions go further than Article 33 in making clear
that access to the orbit-spectrum resource is not necessarily immediate but
depends upon a country's requirements and available resources. The sub-
stitution of the word "requirements" in the two Resolutions for the word
"need" in Article 33 does not appear to modify the basic precondition for
the use of the orbit-spectrum resource. In addition, requirements of effi-
cient and economic use, which are included in all three instruments as
discussed below, fully support this interpretation.
Effects of the Nairobi Conference
The preceding analysis of the meaning of the term "equitable access" has
been based on the "lex lata," that is, on the law as it exists today. Certain
changes were, however, introduced at the recent ITU Plenipotentiary Con-
ference in Nairobi which will enter into force on January 1, 1984, for
countries that have adopted them. 23
The most important change relevant to our discussion is the deletion
from article 33 of the ITC of the phrase "according to their [countries']
needs and the technical facilities at their disposal" and the substitution in
its place of the words "taking into account the special needs of the devel-
oping countries and the geographical situation of particular countries."
This change was preceded by a similarly worded addition to article 10,
para. 3(c) of the ITC requiring the International Frequency Registration
Board (IFRB), in furnishing advice to members, to take into account such
"special needs" and "geographical situations." 24
While these changes were made in a climate of increasing demands on
the part of LDCs for social and economic development and for technical
cooperation and assistance, their effect on existing law must be carefully
determined. At first glance, the omission of the reference to needs and
technical facilities seems to suggest that these will no longer play a role in
determining equitable access. This impression is, however, incorrect for
several reasons. First, the substituted phrase still refers to needs, albeit
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"special needs," of the LDCs which must be taken into account. Second,
whether the actual needs of both developing and developed countries must
still be considered, in addition to their "special needs," depends upon the
interpretation of the word "equitable" as part of the phrase "equitable
access," which has been retained in the revised version of article 33.
The word "equitable" generally is taken to mean "fair," "reasonable,"
"impartial," or something that is "not arbitrary." 25 The term does not
necessarily imply equality. Clearly, a country which has no need or desire
for access should not be accorded access. 26 Since equitable means an
absence of "arbitrariness," no permanent priority should thus be given to
any country for access or use of the orbit/spectrum. This is quite clear from
the relevant portions of the 1971 and 1979 WARC resolutions which have
not been altered either explicitly or implicitly. 27
As for the omission of the reference to available technical facilities, a
similar analysis can be made. The word "access" presupposes a technical
ability to reach the geostationary orbit. Access clearly does not imply
ownership of a position, or segment of the orbit, but only admittance to
it. In addition, access does not imply sharing of the benefits that a country
may derive from its use of the geostationary orbit. Although the common
heritage provision of the Moon Agreement 28 requires "equitable sharing"
by the parties in the benefits derived from lunar and other natural re-
sources, no such requirement exists for the geostationary orbit.
The preceding interpretation of the word "access" is in complete harmo-
ny with the unaltered requirements of "efficient and economical use"
contained in article 33 of the ITC. Efficiency and economy are vital because
of the limited nature of the orbit-spectrum resource. Evidently, neither the
requirement of needs nor that of technical ability has been eliminated
because they are implicit in the terms "efficient and economical use" and
"equitable access." In other words, the revised version of article 33 avoids
a somewhat unnecessary repetition.
The additional requirement, however, to take into account the "special
needs of developing countries" and the "geographical situation of particu-
lar countries" clearly introduces two new elements into the equation.
While the precise meaning of the terms "special needs" and "geographical
situation" remains elusive, Resolution 3 of WARC '79 did state that, in the
use of the geostationary orbit for space services, attention should be given
to the "relevant technical aspects concerning the special geographical
situation of particular countries." 29 This language resulted from a compro-
mise deleting a proposed reference to equatorial countries and substituting
the phrase in question. The substitution allowed for possible consideration
of polar and other (including equatorial) regions. The new version of article
33 omits reference to relevant technical aspects but appears to leave the
door wide open for consideration of geographical situations in general, and
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not just of the "special" geographical situations of particular countries.
Thus, the geographical situations of particular countries, based on whatev-
er criteria (equatorial, polar, etc.), are to be taken into account along with
the special needs of developing countries. Both terms must be considered
within the overall framework of the other essential requirements.
By far the most intriguing question is the relative importance of the
principles of efficient and economical use and equitable access. In what
way, if any, should greater economy or efficiency of newer satellites affect
priorities? Should access be guaranteed when actual use would involve
lesser efficiency and economy? Neither the old nor the revised version of
article 33 answers these questions. Resolutions 2 and 3 of WARC '79
provide little help as well. Article 33 in both of its forms mentions first
"efficient and economical use" and adds "equitable access" at the end of
the same sentence. Resolution 3, on the other hand, reverses the order.
Thus, it appears doubtful that special emphasis was intended by the rele-
vant order of words. More likely, efficiency, economy and equity were
intended to be considered equally in a particular case. It remains to be seen
whether the same can be said for the consideration of the special needs of
developing countries and the geographical situations of particular coun-
tries.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This article has identified three major legal issues arising from the use of
the geostationary orbit: issues of sovereignty, national appropriation, and
equitable access. The first two were raised by claims of equatorial countries
culminating in the Bogota Declaration; the last has resulted from the
persistent efforts of LDCs to obtain what they perceive as their fair share
of global resources. These efforts have stretched well over a decade and are
reflected in ITU related instruments and deliberations.
These issues are closely related, not only because they concern the
geostationary orbit, but also because they stem from the same underlying
motivations of developing countries. The LDC's aspirations have been
expressed frequently in the United Nations and are reflected in the catch-
all phrases of "economic development" and "technical assistance;" in the
invention of new concepts, such as the "common heritage of mankind;"
and in unwavering efforts to establish special international regimes for the
exploitation of the moon and other celestial bodies and the deep seabed.
While the issues of sovereignty and national appropriation appear, for
all practical purposes, to be legally defunct, the LDC's have been successful
in sustaining their demand for a sui generis outer space regime in the United
Nations. Although UNCOPUOS has so far been unable to define outer
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space or to construct a special legal regime, the developing countries'
efforts in the ITU to press for equitable access have moved the debate in
the direction of planning the space services using the geostationary orbit.
The 1985 Space WARC is expected to address the issue of planning and
to determine the kinds of frequency bands and space services to be planned
with due regard to efficient and economical use and equitable access. Once
the Nairobi changes go into effect, the "special needs" of developing
countries and the "geographical situation" of particular countries must also
be considered. Ultimately, what is or is not "efficient and economical use"
and "equitable access," much like what are or are not to be regarded
"special needs" and "geographical situations," will have to be determined
on the basis of accepted criteria.
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